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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the impacts of financial constraints, growth 
opportunities and debt overhang on firm-level investments in 12 Asian countries, 
Australia and New Zealand over the period 1990–2010. Using Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) models that overcome the shortcomings of linear investment models, 
we show that the PSTR models have greater explanatory power than linear models. The 
empirical results show that for firms with growth opportunities, (1) investment is sensitive 
to the availability of internal finance and (2) debt overhang reduces investment by firms 
with higher leverage through a 'liquidity' effect. Our findings imply that the managers of 
financially constrained firms in developed countries in the Asian region respond 
differently to productivity shocks and growth opportunities than financially constrained 
firms in emerging markets and developing countries. In addition, in emerging Asian 
economies, higher equity valuations increased firm-level investment after the stock 
markets opened to foreign investors. Accordingly, policy makers should review their 
liberalisation measures and seek to understand the mechanisms at work in order to 
bolster international investors' confidence and stimulate foreign investment.  
 
Keywords: Asia, debt overhang, growth opportunities, investment, smooth transition 
model   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The impact of financial constraints on firms' investment decisions has been of 
longstanding interest to economists and policy makers. Starting with Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), a common approach to investigating investment-
cash flow (ICF) sensitivity has been to separate firms into multiple groups using 
a single and/or multiple financial variable(s)
1
 that a priori mirror unobservable 
financial constraints. Thus, firms are ex ante partitioned into groups of 
constrained and unconstrained firms over the entire sample period.
2
 Most studies 
find that constrained firms exhibit greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
irrespective of the proxy variable(s) used (see, e.g., Hubbard, 1998; Brown & 
Petersen, 2009).  
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The main motivation of this study is to extend ICF sensitivity analysis to 
Asian countries using a larger panel dataset. Because previous studies in this area 
have focused on US firms, less is known about the investment behaviour of firms 
in Asian countries.
3 
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to study Asian 
countries, one of which is that reforms to financial markets were implemented 
differently in Asian countries than they were elsewhere (Bekaert, Harvey, & 
Lundblad, 2005; Schmukler & Vesperoni, 2002; Bekaert & Harvey, 2000). For 
instance, Laeven's (2003) study of 13 developing countries reports that the 
liberalisation of banking sectors in Asian countries focused on interest rate 
liberalisation, the entry of foreign banks and the reduction of state-directed credit. 
Although financial reforms were less comprehensive in some Asian countries 
than in others, the common underlying motivation was to decrease government 
control of financial markets. In addition, financial reforms were thought to have a 
'quantitative' impact on economic growth.  
 
Bekaert et al. (2005) argue that if markets are imperfect and financing 
constraints exist, then external finance will be more costly than internal finance 
and investment will be sensitive to cash flows. Financial liberalisation may affect 
economic growth by reducing imperfections in capital markets, which in turn 
may reduce the external finance premium. We argue that different strategies of 
financial liberalisation have different impacts on the wedge between the cost of 
internal funds and the cost of external funds. Laeven (2003) reports that financial 
liberalisation reduces market imperfections. In particular, the opening of stock 
markets to foreign investors reduces financing constraints by making more 
foreign capital available to domestic firms. Moreover, foreign investors may 
insist on better corporate governance, which may indirectly reduce the wedge 
between the costs of internal and external finance. Galindo, Schiantarelli and 
Weiss (2005) argue that the positive effect of financial liberalisation on growth 
may be due more to liberalisation's effect on the efficiency with which 
investment funds are allocated across firms and industry sectors and less to the 
quantity of resources mobilised. 
 
 In this paper, we used a panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) 
approach that allows individual firms to switch between groups (regimes) each 
year. The uniqueness of this approach lies in the fact that it does not require a 
priori segregation of the sample firms into groups of financially constrained 
firms and financially unconstrained firms, as was the case in previous studies. 
The PSTR approach uses a transition variable for sorting firms, which allows ICF 
sensitivities to be interpreted in a time-varying fashion and relates the magnitude 
of ICF sensitivities to capital market imperfections. González, Teräsvirta and 
Dijk (2005) developed this approach and estimated the model for US firms; our 
study is the only one to apply this model to Asian countries.  
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Our main results using the PSTR approach show that ICF sensitivity is 
explained by the non-linear influence of internal cash flows, growth opportunities 
and debt overhang problems. The results show that although all three of these 
factors influence firm-level investment in the Asian region during the period 
1990–2010, the influence of growth opportunities is the most significant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
External finance is not a perfect substitute for internal finance due to its higher 
relative cost. Thus, firms that face information asymmetry problems may be 
crowded out of financial markets; these firms develop a relatively strong 
preference for internal finance over external finance. Moreover, information 
asymmetries in financial markets and the resulting preference of firms for internal 
finance are exacerbated in developing countries due to tighter governmental 
controls over the banking sectors. Accordingly, firms in developing countries 
face more severe financing constraints as a result of information asymmetries 
than firms in countries with developed financial markets. Indeed, Islam and 
Mozumdar (2007, p. 656) report that for every dollar reduction in internal cash 
flow, an average non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) firm decreases investments by $ 0.23; the corresponding decrease for an 
average OECD firm is only $ 0.141. The greater degree of underinvestment in 
profitable investment opportunities that is associated with less developed 
financial markets represents a deadweight welfare loss.
4
 
 
After the implementation of financial reforms and the development of 
capital market infrastructure in Asia, the reduction of ICF sensitivity in less 
developed countries depends on the extent to which their financial markets have 
developed. Our argument is centred on the assumption that investment patterns 
among Asian firms differ as a result of firm-specific characteristics and the 
country-specific effects of financial liberalisation (quantitative and qualitative). 
For example, decreased governmental control over the allocation of credit, 
reduced reserve requirements and the privatisation of banks may have positive 
quantitative effects on the availability of external finance. However, the 
elimination of subsidised credit programs (which is another common feature of 
financial reforms) may increase financing constraints for firms that previously 
benefited from access to bank loans at subsidised rates (Laeven, 2003). In 
addition, according to debt overhang theories (Myers, 1977; Hennessy, 2004), 
high leverage may reduce a firm's ability to finance investments through a 
liquidity effect. Debt overhang theories imply that an increase in leverage 
increases the probability that a firm will forego positive net present value (NPV) 
projects in the future.
5
 Accordingly, the impact of debt overhang on the 
investments of highly leveraged firms is much more significant than its impact on 
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the investments of low-leverage firms. Because all-equity firms can always issue 
safe debt, shortfalls in cash flow should have only a negligible effect on 
investment at these firms. In contrast, highly leveraged firms face an 
underinvestment problem and may not be able to raise outside funds at all. We 
argue that firms that benefitted from government-subsidised loans are likely to 
have much higher leverage than firms that did not receive subsidised loans. Firms 
that are highly leveraged due to government-subsidised loans can mitigate their 
debt overhang problems if incremental investment is financed partially with new 
secured debt (Myers, 1977) and partially with equity finance, i.e., if they 
rebalance their capital structures. The liberalisation of stock markets in Asia may 
help firms to achieve this. For instance, the introduction of a country fund and the 
opening of stock markets to foreign investors may drive up the stock prices of 
listed domestic firms and thereby reduce their respective costs of capital. When 
stock prices are high, firms are more likely to finance expansion by raising new 
external equity finance (which demonstrates a quantitative impact of financial 
liberalisation). Thus, access to equity finance is likely to reduce firms' financing 
constraints. The qualitative impact of liberalisation can be seen in better 
corporate governance and improved corporate disclosure policies, which also 
help to reduce the cost of equity capital.  
 
A standard approach to measuring ICF sensitivity has been to estimate 
the linear regression of physical investment on cash flow and Tobin's q ratio 
and/or using the Euler dynamic optimisation equation. These regression 
estimations have been previously been performed using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and/or the dynamic generalised methods of moments (GMM) techniques 
of Bond and Meghir (1994). However, these methods have been criticised on 
various grounds, including the discrepancy between the average q ratio and the 
marginal q ratio; the omission of important variables, such as equity financing 
and debt financing (Brown & Petersen, 2009); and the questionable validity of 
the instruments used in GMM. Recent studies report that ICF sensitivity has 
decreased in developing countries (see Islam & Mozumdar, 2007; Cleary, 2006; 
Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003; Wurgler, 2000). Using data from 31 countries, Islam 
and Mozumdar (2007) find evidence of a negative relationship between financial 
market development and the importance of internal capital. Cleary (2006) sorts 
the firms of developing countries using three different measures of financial 
development and concludes that ICF sensitivity is lower for smaller firms and for 
firms with greater financing constraints. In the study most closely related to ours, 
Laeven (2003) reports that financial liberalisation appears to affect small and 
large firms differently. Specifically, although financial liberalisation reduces the 
financing constraints of small firms (by approximately 80% on average), it 
increases the financing constraints of large firms. This is likely because large 
firms have better access to preferential directed credit before liberalisation. 
 
Financial Constraints, Debt Overhang and Corporate Investment 
59 
Although some studies of developing countries find that ICF sensitivity 
decreases after the development of financial markets, other studies find no 
evidence of a change in financing constraints after financial reforms (see Agung, 
2000; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, & Weiss, 1996; Harris, Schiantarelli, & Siregar, 
1994). We argue that the different findings may be explained by the inability of 
the selected proxy variables to capture the magnitude of financial constraints. 
Previous studies have tried to measure the severity of financial constraints using 
sales, dividend pay-out ratios, and relationships with large banks (see, e.g., 
Laeven, 2003; Love; 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Hoshi, Kashyap, & 
Scharfstein, 1991). However, the relative importance of these proxy variables 
may differ depending on a country's level of financial development (Cleary, 
2006).  
 
Moreover, the level of a country's financial development may have 
different effects on firm-level investment (see Agca & Mozumdar, 2008; Laeven, 
2003; Love, 2003) and investment efficiency (see Galindo et al., 2005) depending 
upon the impact of financial reforms on capital market imperfections. In addition, 
Laeven (2003) argues that financial reforms change the composition and 
allocation of savings but do not necessarily relax financial constraints for all 
firms. These factors limit the reliability of prior studies and give more credibility 
to the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) approach.  
 
The PSTR approach has several advantages. Essentially, PSTR is a 
regime-switching model that allows for a small number of extreme regimes 
associated with the extreme value of a transition function and where the transition 
from one regime to another is smooth (Fouquau, Hurlin, & Rabaud, 2008). The 
PSTR method helps us to determine whether a firm operates at any point in time 
in one of two investment regimes, each of which exhibits either a high or a low 
level of investment sensitivity to a threshold variable, such as cash flow. 
Movement from one regime to another can represent an adjustment in response 
to, e.g., a reduction in capital market imperfections. We argue that asymmetric 
firms' investment behaviour is better understood with a smooth transition model 
than with a linear investment model that is based on a priori classification of 
constrained and unconstrained firms.  
 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Data 
 
We collected firm-level financial data from Thompson Financial & Worldscope 
for listed manufacturing firms (2-digit Global Industry Classification Standard 
[GICS] 20) in 12 Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
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Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), 
Australia and New Zealand. We include developed countries (such as Japan) in 
the sample to gauge whether firms in emerging markets and developing countries 
in Asia have been able to finance investments in a manner similar to firms in 
developed countries. In other words, we evaluate whether financial reforms 
increase the size and structure of financial markets in emerging markets and 
developing countries and thereby reduce the cost of external finance in these 
areas to a level similar to that in developed countries. Using the same indicators 
as Beck and Levine (2002)
6
 to measure the structure, activity and size of various 
financial markets, we classify the sample countries into three categories: 
Developed (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore), Emerging (China, 
India, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) and Developing (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand). Some of the countries in our 
sample underwent multiple financial market reforms between 1991 and 2000. 
Laeven (2003) provides detailed descriptions of the financial market reforms in 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. As in Islam and Mozumdar (2007), we limit the sample to firms with at 
least three consecutive years of the financial data required for a PSTR estimation. 
We focus exclusively on manufacturing firms, which have been studied 
extensively in the investment literature (Brown & Petersen, 2009). Our main 
results are based on a final sample of 813 manufacturing firms over the period 
1990–2010. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
 
 Table 1 shows that firms have a mean (median) investment ratio of 0.04 
(0.03), a mean (median) cash flow-to-assets ratio of 0.045 (0.048) and low debt 
ratios. However, once we account for the sector affiliation of the sample firms, 
differences among them are revealed. For instance, firms in the airline 
manufacturing and aerospace and defence industries have the highest debt ratios 
and q ratios, whereas industrial conglomerates have the highest investment ratios 
and sales ratios. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics. The means, medians, standard deviations, 
minimums and maximums of the explanatory variables are presented in Panel A. The 
mean values for each industry in the GIC 20 sector (Industrials) are presented in Panel B. 
I is the total investment in property, plant and equipment in year t divided by total assets 
at the beginning of year t; CF is the cash flow-to-assets ratio, which is calculated as after 
tax income before extraordinary items plus depreciation in year t divided by total assets at 
the beginning of year t. D is total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
and S is total sales in year t divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. Q is Tobin's 
q ratio, which is calculated as the sum of the total market value of shares and the book 
value of debt divided by total assets the beginning of year t. N is the total number of 
firms. 
 
Panel A       
 Mean  Median  Std Min Max N  
I  0.0414 0.0290 0.0435 0.0473 0.5632 813 
CF 0.0457 0.0481 0.1815 –10.2133 1.3924 813 
S 0.9437 0.8937 0.4227 0.0014 4.6614 813 
Q 0.9512 0.7141 1.2318 0.0748 59.6337 813 
D 0.2286 0.2033 0.3003 0.0000 19.0667 813 
  Panel B: Average values 
GIC 20 category: Industrials I S CF D Q 
Industry-sector      
Aerospace and defence 0.08774 1.20620 0.26025 0.5829 4.01742 
Building products 0.04941 1.20242 0.06670 0.2267 1.03240 
Construction/engineering 0.02942 1.28898 0.02288 0.2062 0.82982 
Electrical equipment 0.07262 1.30068 0.07696 0.2193 1.44499 
Industrial conglomerates 0.20853 3.11383 0.17487 0.2706 2.82397 
Machinery 0.05565 1.06054 0.06871 0.2119 1.19418 
Trading companies/distributors 0.08817 2.84229 0.04546 0.2531 1.39809 
Commercial services and supplies 0.10180 1.93912 0.18178 0.1449 3.18959 
Diversified commercial 0.03099 1.37158 0.05969 0.1835 2.09224 
Air freight logistics 0.05848 1.67964 0.08710 0.2039 0.92590 
Airlines 0.49208 2.43751 0.32605 0.5002 2.49417 
Marine 0.16394 1.27774 0.14119 0.4109 1.19834 
Road and rail 0.18939 1.98476 0.23374 0.4508 4.16468 
Transport infrastructure 0.04245 0.57038 0.00005 0.3575 3.75660 
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Empirical Model 
 
The smooth transition model is a relatively new technique in the investment 
literature. Its approach is similar to the threshold regression technique of Hansen 
(2000), which specifies that firm-level observations can be divided into classes 
based on the values of an observed variable. The smooth transition model  has 
found immense usefulness in macroeconomic studies. For instance, Fouquau      
et al. (2008) use the PSTR model developed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) to solve 
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle of the relationship between domestic savings and 
investment rates. The basic PSTR model of Gonzalez et al. (2005) is defined as 
 
ititititiit ucsgxxy  ),;(10    (1) 
 
for i = 1, …, N and t = 1, …, T, the dependent variable yit is a scalar, xit is a              
k-dimensional vector of time-varying exogenous variables, µi represents the fixed 
individual effect and uit is the error variable. ¢b0  and ¢b1 are parameters, and N 
and T denote the cross-section and time dimensions of the panel, respectively. 
The transition function g(sit; γ, c) is a continuous function of the observable 
variable sit and is normalised to be bounded between 0 and 1. The transition 
variable sit determines the value of g(sit; γ, c), i.e., the effective regression 
coefficients for an individual firm i in period t. The transition function 
),;( ,, csg tji   is a continuous and bounded function of the threshold variable (or 
appropriately named transition variable), as follows: 
 
(2)           ...;0  with  )})(exp{1(),;( 21
1
1
1 mit
m
j
it ccccscsg 


 
 
where  sit denotes the transition variable and ),....( 1 mccc   denotes a vector with 
m dimensions of location parameters. γ is the slope parameter that determines the 
smoothness of the transition variable. The value of the estimated slope parameter 
is crucial; a large value implies that the transition function is sharp and 
corresponds to indicator function, whereas a small value implies that the panel 
cannot be divided into a small number of classes because the estimated 
parameters are distributed over a "continuum". A small value also provides 
strong evidence against artificially dividing firms into sub-samples and 
estimating a linear model for each sub-sample, which is the norm in current 
empirical studies. Let us consider the following PSTR investment model:  
 
  ,,),;1,,(}1,,4,11,,3,11,,2,11,,1,1{                        
    ,,S4,01,,3,01,,2,01,,1,0,,,,      
tjictjisLFtjiStjiDtjiQtjiCF
tjitjiDtjiQtjiCFjtdjitjiI



  (3) 
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where for a firm i in a country j, I is the total investment in property, plant and 
equipment in year t divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. The main 
explanatory variables are as follows. Cash flow-to-assets ratio, denoted by CF, is 
calculated as after tax income before extraordinary items plus depreciation in 
year t divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. Leverage, denoted by D, 
is total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. Future growth 
opportunity is proxied by Tobin's q ratio (Q), which is the sum of the market 
value of outstanding shares and the book value of debt in year t divided by total 
assets at the beginning of year t. According to Bond, Klemm, Newton-Smith, 
Syed and Vlieghe (2004), the effectiveness of the q ratio as a proxy for future 
growth opportunity depends on whether there are measurement errors due to 
stock market overvaluation (see Erickson & Whited, 2000). Including the cash 
flow-to-assets ratio in the model is useful in this regard because it provides 
information about expected future profitability that is not correlated with Tobin's 
q ratio. S is total sales divided by total assets at the beginning of year t. The 
lagged S is a proxy for future demand for a firm's output; therefore, it is included 
as an additional control for a firm's future profit opportunities. Under imperfect 
competition, lagged S should have a positive effect on firm-level investment. 
ji,  denotes firm-specific fixed effects to control for unobservable firm effects, 
and td  denotes time-dummies to capture unobserved macroeconomic shocks. All 
variables are in nominal terms.  
 
           ...;0  with  )})(exp{1(),;( 21
1
,,
1
1,, mtji
m
j
tjiL ccccscsF 


 
(4) 
 
We choose the logistic function over the exponential function in equation 
(4) for the following reasons. A logistic function takes values in –0.5 ≤ F (.) ≤ 0.5 
and generates data when the dynamics of the regime differ depending on signs of 
innovation. In contrast, in an exponential function, the dynamics of the regime 
depend on the magnitude of innovations. Thus, when innovation is a continuous 
process, the logistic function does a better job tracking smooth transitions 
between states.
6
  
 
Prior to the estimation of the PSTR investment model, we must select an 
appropriate transition variable and test the non-linearity of the PSTR investment 
models (with fixed-effects) against the linear investment model (with fixed-
effects), i.e., Lagrange Multiplier (LM)1F (H0: γ = 0; H1: γ ≠ 0) in equation (2).
7
 
To select an appropriate transition variable, we start with variables that have been 
used in the previous investment literature. A number of studies have found a non-
linear relationship between cash flow and investment (see, e.g., Minton & 
Schrand, 1999), which suggests that cash flow is an ideal variable for testing non-
linearity. Under perfect capital market conditions, firms with investment 
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opportunities are free to borrow. However, when capital markets are imperfect 
and information asymmetries about the quality of investment projects exist 
between borrowers and lenders, lenders demand a higher interest rate on debt. 
This situation creates heavy reliance on cash flows (internal financing). Thus, in 
the first PSTR specification (hereafter Model A), we assume that the transition is 
determined by CF, and firms are automatically assigned to upper (lower) regimes 
of CF. 
 
From an economic perspective, in perfect capital and output markets, 
Tobin's q ratio is an important determinant of a firm's investment. Abel and 
Ebery (1994) find evidence of non-linearity in the investment function using the 
q ratio under assumptions of convex costs and irreversibility of investment. In 
that framework, there are regions in which investment in a homogeneous capital 
good is insensitive to the q ratio as well as regions where investment is sensitive 
to the q ratio. Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) estimate the relationship between 
investment and the q ratio at the firm level by allowing the relationship to vary 
across regimes based on the level of the q ratio. Furthermore, Morgado and 
Pindado (2003) argue that the relationship between investment and cash flow is 
positive for firms that have low-quality growth opportunities. Similarly, for firms 
with high quality growth opportunities, a positive relationship exists between 
investment and cash flow. Therefore, in line with the previous literature, we use 
the q ratio as the transition variable in the second specification (hereafter Model 
B). 
 
According to the debt overhang hypothesis (Hennessy, 2004; Whited, 
1992), leverage may reduce firms' ability to finance investments through a 
liquidity effect. Debt overhang has a much greater effect on highly leveraged 
firms than on low-leverage firms. In particular, because firms with higher debt 
ratios are burdened with debt repayment, their investment decisions are much 
more sensitive to internal cash flows. Therefore, in the third specification 
(hereafter Model C), the threshold (or transition) variable is D. Hu and 
Schiantarelli (1998) use the debt ratio in their switching regression for US firms. 
We argue that the selection of variables is not ad hoc; rather, because each 
variable makes sense from an economic standpoint, each should influence firms' 
transitions between the upper and lower regimes.  
 
In addition to the linearity test, we must decide on the number of 
transition functions, i.e., the number of regimes required to capture all remaining 
non-linearity. To do this, we use the testing procedure outlined in Gonzalez et al. 
(2005).
8
 Table 2 reports the values of statistics LM1F and LM2F. The results show 
clearly that the non-linear PSTR investment models
9
 (with fixed-effects) are 
superior to the linear investment model (with fixed-effects). The linearity test 
clearly rejects the null hypothesis of linearity using CF, Q and D, but the value of 
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the LM1F statistic is higher for CF.
10
 However, LM2F is strongly rejected only for 
CF and D, which suggests a PSTR investment model with two transition 
functions, as follows: 
 
  ,,)2,2;1,,(2}1,,S4,21,,3,21,,2,21,,1,2{                        
)1,1;1,,(1}1,,4,11,,3,11,,2,11,,1,1{                        
    ,,4,01,,3,01,,2,01,,1,0,,,,      
tjictjiDLFtjitjiDtjiQtjiCF
ctjiCFLFtjiStjiDtjiQtjiCF
tjiStjiDtjiQtjiCFjtdjitjiI






(5) 
 
Where F
L1
 is the first transition function, F
L2
 is the second transition function, 
CF
i,j,t–1 is the second transition variable. 
 
We argue that a PSTR model with two transition functions is a better 
representation of firms' investment behaviour in the sample countries because 
information asymmetries and investment opportunities change over time, and a 
model with two transition functions allows firms to switch between regimes 
accordingly. In addition, cross-country heterogeneity and time variations in ICF 
sensitivity can be tested more precisely with two transition functions.  
 
Table 2 
Linearity and number of regimes test 
 
Panel A of this table reports the LM test statistics and associated p-values for tests of the 
hypothesis H0: γ = 0; H1: γ ≠ 0. The results of the linear investment model are presented 
alongside the results of non-linear PSTR investment models. Panel B reports the results 
for PSTR investment models with one transition function and PSTR investment models 
with two transition functions.  
 
Panel A: Linearity test Model A Model B Model C 
  CF Q D 
LM1F (H0: γ = 0; H1: γ ≠ 0) 113.64 122.14 54.47 
p value  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     
 
Panel B: No. of transition functions Model A Model B Model C 
  CF Q D 
(H0:r = 0; H1: r = 1) LM2F 97.94 30.43 58.56 
 p value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   
  Single vs. Two transition functions 
(H0:r = 1; H1: r = 2)  (CF,Q) (CF,D) (Q,D) 
 LM2F 65.93 171.42 26.37 
 p value (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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We estimate the PSTR models using the maximum likelihood method. 
We hypothesise that firms with estimated coefficients of 0,0 1,11,0    in 
Model A, which imply lower cash flows, will have higher ICF sensitivities than 
firms with higher cash flows. For Model B, we hypothesise that firms with 
estimated coefficients of 0,0 2,12,0   , i.e., firms with low growth 
opportunities, will decrease investments relative to firms with high growth 
opportunities. For Model C, we hypothesise that firms with estimated coefficients 
of 0,3 > 0,  1,3 < 0, which imply lower leverage, will increase investments. Our 
reasoning for this hypothesis is as follows: after liberalisation, firms with lower 
leverage can borrow in foreign capital markets to fund future investments, 
whereas highly leveraged firms will reduce investments due to increased 
financial risk.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The estimation results using the linear 
investment model (with fixed effects) with and without industry dummies show 
that only the q ratio has a significant impact on investment. The value of Adj. R
2
 
implies that the linear investment model (with fixed effects) explains 50% of the 
variation in firm-level investments in the sample countries. However, the 
estimation results from the PSTR investment models tell a different story. First, 
the respective values of Adj. R
2
 show that the PSTR investment models (with 
fixed effects) have higher explanatory power than the linear investment model 
(with fixed effects). Second, the estimated values of the slope parameter   
indicate that Model B is superior to both Model A and Model C, which implies 
that the transition between the extreme regimes is smoother when the q ratio is 
used as a threshold variable.
11
 Figure 1 shows the transition functions estimated 
from Models B and C.
12 
These results provide further evidence of  heterogeneity 
in investment opportunities for Asian firms over the period 1991–2010. 
 
 The estimation results of Model A show that the coefficients 1,1 and 0,1 
are positive and negative, respectively. Firms with higher cash flows rely to a 
greater extent on internal finance for investments than firms with lower cash 
flows, and the investments of firms with higher cash flows respond more 
positively to changes in growth opportunities (i.e., 1,2 is more significantly 
positive than 0,2). From an economic perspective, for every dollar reduction in 
internal cash flow, a firm must reduce investment by $ 0.12. This result 
demonstrates that although ICF sensitivity has decreased in Asian countries, it 
has not been eliminated. In addition, as hypothesised, firms with high levels of 
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internal finance do not use external finance, i.e., the coefficient 1,3 is more 
significantly negative than0,3. 
 
 For Model B, in which transition is determined by the q ratio, the 
coefficient 0,1 is not significant but the coefficient 1,1 is both positive and 
significant, which implies that firms with valuable growth opportunities face 
financial constraints. 0,2 is significantly positive, and 1,2 is significantly 
negative. According to Jensen (1988), the control function of debt is more 
important in organisations that have low growth prospects. The coefficient 0,3 is 
significantly negative and 1,3 is significantly positive, which suggests that firms 
with high-quality future growth opportunities are able to use debt finance. This 
finding is supported by Campello, Graham and Harvey (2009), who find that 
when financially constrained firms have growth opportunities, they draw heavily 
on bank lines of credit. 
 
For Model C, 0,1 is significantly positive and 1,1 is significantly 
negative. This result implies that firms with lower debt ratios are financially 
constrained whereas firms with higher debt ratios are not. Although the 
coefficient 0,2 is not significant, 1,2  is both positive and significant, which 
implies that firms with more future growth opportunities increase their levels of 
investment. 0,3  is significantly negative, which provides strong support for the 
pecking order hypothesis, i.e., firms with low leverage rely more on cash flows 
than external debt (which provides a mechanical justification for a positive sign 
on 0,1). The coefficient 0,4 is significantly positive compared to1,4, suggesting 
that although changes in sales affect investment levels at firms with lower 
debt ratios, they do not affect investment levels at firms with higher debt 
ratios. This finding suggests that the accelerator effect fits the investment 
behaviour of less leveraged firms in Asian economies. The increased 
economic growth experienced by Asian economies after the implementation 
of financial reforms in the 1990s may have contributed to increases in output, 
which may have led in turn to further increases in investment in these 
economies via a multiplier effect caused by increased aggregate domestic 
consumption. 
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Table 3  
Panel smooth transition regression estimation – single transition function 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the PSTR investment model that has one 
transition function (refer to Eq. [3]). 
 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Linear model 
(without industry 
sector dummies) 
Linear model 
(with industry 
sector 
dummies) 
Model A Model B Model C 
Transition 
variable, 
tjis ,,  
 
–  CF Q D 
0,1 (–) 0.0006
 
(0.0022) 
0.0013 
(0.0046) 
– 0.1051*** 
(0.0254) 
– 0.0150 
(0.0139) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0069) 
0,2 (+) 0.0014
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0015** 
(0.0004) 
– 0.0051*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0,3 (+) – 0.0164
*** 
(0.0040) 
– 0.0160*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0103 
(0.0148) 
– 0.1069*** 
(0.0122) 
– 0.0545** 
(0.0256) 
0,4 (+) 0.0046
* 
(0.0023) 
0.0044* 
(0.0023) 
– 0.0466*** 
(0.0137) 
– 0.0030 
(0.0048) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0027) 
1,1 (–) –  –  0.1247
*** 
(0.0258) 
0.0401*** 
(0.0199) 
– 0.0365*** 
(0.0089) 
1,2 (+) –  –  0.0115
*** 
(0.0018) 
– 0.0339*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0085*** 
(0.0013) 
1,3 (+) –  –  – 0.0509
*** 
(0.0157) 
0.1233*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0187 
(0.0249) 
1,4 (+) –  –  0.0486
*** 
(0.0135) 
0.0096 
(0.0087) 
– 0.0067*** 
(0.0024) 

1
  –  –  29.68340
*** 
(0.5275) 
0.0917** 
(0.0147) 
14.5073*** 
(6.5159) 
c
1
  –  –  – 2.1117 
(0.0145) 
8.8858*** 
(3.2596) 
0.6143*** 
(0.0549) 

2
  –  –  –  –  –  
c
2
  –  – –  –  –  
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Expected 
sign 
Linear model 
(without industry 
sector dummies) 
Linear 
model 
(with 
industry 
sector 
dummies) 
Model A Model B Model C 
Transition 
variable, 
tjis ,,  
 
–  CF Q D 
Adj. R2  0.5139 0.5147 0.5279 0.5301 0.5222 
Durbin-
Watson (DW) 
test 
 1.5219 
1.7731 
1.5428 1.5598 1.5358 
Residual sum 
squared (RSS) 
 4.0373 
 
3.8487 3.8997 3.9654 
No. of firms  813 813 813 813 813 
N   5222 5222 5209 5222 5222 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1.  Transition functions of the q ratio and the debt ratio 
 
The estimation results for Models D, E and F, which use two transition 
functions,
13,14
 are reported in Table 4. Apparently, there is an increase in the 
explanatory power of the models; however, there is also an increase in the value 
of the slope parameter 1 . The increase in 1  is higher for Model E than for 
Models D and F for the first transition but lower for Model E than for Models D 
and F for the second transition. Accordingly, because a higher value of the slope 
parameter indicates much faster transitions, the PSTR investment models with 
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two transition functions are not 'optimal' models despite their higher explanatory 
powers. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Our results show that for Model D, the respective signs of coefficients 
CF, Q and D associated with the first transition function (where the transition 
variable is CF) are similar to those reported for Model E. However, the respective 
signs of coefficients CF, Q and D associated with the second transition function 
vary across all models. Our empirical results imply that due to internal cash flow 
constraints and debt overhang problems, firms with valuable growth 
opportunities face financial constraints; as a result, they decrease their 
investments relative to firms without such growth opportunities. This provides 
empirical support for the underinvestment problem identified by Islam and 
Mozumdar (2007).  
 
 
Table 4 
Panel smooth transition regression estimation – two transition functions 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the PSTR investment model that has two 
transition functions (refer to Eq. [5]). 
 
 Expected sign Model D Model E Model F 
1,0  
(– ) 
 
– 0.1369***(0.0215) – 0.3215***(0.1030) – 4.7842***(1.7085) 
2,0  (+) – 0.0106
***(0.0022) – 0.3394***(0.0552) – 7.4835***(1.1662) 
3,0  (+) – 0.0194(0.0250) – 0.1575
***(0.0781) – 6.6079***(1.6938) 
4,0  (+) – 0.0189
***(0.0120) – 0.1268***(0.0192) – 0.06523*(0.3365) 
1st transition variable, tjis ,,1  CF CF Q 
1,1  (– ) 0.1683
***(0.0216) 0.1629***(0.0236) 4.8206***(1.7126) 
2,1  (+) 0.0143
***(0.0026) 0.0125***(0.0026) 7.4828***(1.1660) 
3,1  (+) – 0.0485
***(0.0132) – 0.0579***(0.0121) 6.6004***(1.6991) 
4,1  (+) 0.0887
***(0.0126) 0.0959***(0.0128) 0.6546***(0.3383) 
    (continued on next page) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 Expected sign Model D Model E Model F 
2nd transition variable, tjis ,,2  D 
Q D  
2,1 (– ) – 0.0297
**(0.0145) 0.1860*(0.1063) – 0.0739***(0.1040) 
2,2 (+) 0.0137
***(0.0017) 0.3270***(0.0549) – 0.0027(0.0018) 
2,3 (+) 0.0129(0.0217) 0.1806
**(0.0779) – 0.0290***(0.0097) 
2,4 (+) – 0.0067
***(0.0025) 0.0349
**(0.0162) 0.0102***(0.0054) 
1  5.8368
***(0.0192) 69.8886***(8.4304) 1.8672***(0.1029) 
c1  – 2.3604
***(0.0036) – 0.4232***(0.0207) – 2.2229****(0.2582) 
2  64.3229
***(27.5194) 2.2086(0.2736) 67.1630***(4.8868) 
C2  0.1156
***(0.0080) – 0.3709(0.4579) 0.4930***(0.0086) 
Adj. R2  0.5367 0.5407 0.6087 
DW Test  1.5366 1.5519 1.5659 
RSS  3.8152 3.8051 3.8589 
No. of firms  813 813 813 
N  5219 5219 5222 
  Note:  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 presents the PSTR estimation results for the sample countries 
separated into the three categories described above (Developed, Emerging and 
Developing). CF is used as a transition variable, and we control for the impact of 
economic growth using GDP, shareholder rights and creditor rights. The data on 
shareholder rights and creditor rights were obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). 
There are three points worth mentioning when comparing the pooled results (see 
Table 4) with the country-classification results. First, the magnitude and sign of 
0,1 for financially constrained firms in developed countries imply that ICF 
sensitivity is much lower for these firms than for financially constrained firms in 
emerging markets and developing countries. Second, both 0,2 and 1,2 are 
significantly positive for financially constrained firms in developing countries 
and emerging markets, suggesting that these firms experience underinvestment 
problems when presented with growth opportunities. Third, financially 
constrained firms in developing countries experience underinvestment problems 
due to debt overhang; therefore, these firms respond differently to productivity 
shocks and growth opportunities than financially constrained firms in emerging 
markets and developed countries. The results also show that financially 
unconstrained firms in all three categories use both internal and external finance 
to fund future investments. 
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Table 5  
Panel smooth transition regression estimation using alternative sample splits  
 
This table reports the estimation results of the following PSTR investment model (refer to 
Eq. [3]). 
 
 
 1 2 3 
Coefficients Developed   Emerging  Developing  
1,0  0.0192
 
(0.0422) 
0.0359** 
(0.0170) 
0.0387* 
(0.0235) 
2,0  0.0154
*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0408*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0501*** 
(0.0128) 
3,0  0.0353
*** 
(0.0149) 
– 0.0695* 
(0.0377) 
– 0.0611 
(0.0396) 
4,0  – 0.0202
*** 
(0.0109) 
0.0314 
(0.0321) 
0.0317 
(0.0318) 
1,1  – 0.0732
 
(0.1060) 
– 0.0644*** 
(0.0272) 
– 0.0665*** 
(0.0313) 
2,1  – 0.0139
*** 
(0.1802) 
– 0.0497** 
(0.0252) 
– 0.0571*** 
(0.0216) 
3,1  – 0.0485
 
(0.0354) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0135* 
(0.0786) 
4,1  0.0248
* 
(0.0471) 
0.0003 
(0.0069) 
– 0.0059 
(0.0555) 
1  10.0319
*** 
(0.9965) 
3.347*** 
(1.5596) 
2.2222*** 
(0.8869) 
1c  
 
9.4163*** 
(0.9530) 
0.4298*** 
(0.0714) 
1.0006*** 
(0.5215) 
Control variables    
Real_gross domestic product (GDP) 0.0197*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0017* 
(0.0009) 
0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
Creditor_rights 0.0003 
(0.0001) 
– 0.0003 
(0.0018) 
– 0.0113 
(0.0188) 
Shareholder_rights 0.0005 
(0.0121) 
– 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
– 0.0013 
(0.0008) 
Adj. R2 0.253 0.069 0.0700 
DW test 1.5098 1.8062 1.8022 
Firms  412 278 123 
N  3221 1628 480 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Heterogeneity and Time Variation of the PSTR Estimated Coefficients  
 
We also examine the heterogeneity and time variation of the estimated 
coefficients from a non-linear PSTR model. To this end, we only consider Model 
B, i.e., the model that uses the q ratio as a transition variable. We again split the 
sample firms into three categories (Developed, Emerging and Developing) to 
highlight the economic and financial development that occurred over the period 
1991–2010. Figure 2 shows that the q ratio coefficients from the PSTR model are 
heterogeneous from one country to another. For instance, when the q ratio is 
between 0.5 and 1, the q ratio coefficients are lower for developed countries than 
for emerging economies. When the q ratio is between 1.50 and 2, a completely 
different trend appears; specifically, the coefficient is higher only for developed 
countries. In summary, the heterogeneity of q ratio coefficients proves that the 
PSTR model efficiently detects changes in firm-level investment in response to 
changes in investment opportunities over the period 1991–2010.  
 
Figure 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the q ratio for each 
individual country over the period 1991–2010. These estimates are derived using 
the values of the estimated parameters of Model B and the average values of the q 
ratio for each country from 1991 to 2010. The estimated coefficients are 
remarkably heterogeneous across the three categories of countries. Although the 
estimated coefficients for the four developed countries during 1993–1996 are 
similar to each other, the curves for Australia and New Zealand take a more 
upward direction after 1997 than the curves for Japan and Singapore. For both 
emerging markets and developing countries, the estimated coefficient values 
were higher during the period of financial reforms (1990–1995) than during other 
periods, suggesting that firm-level investments in these economies respond to 
new future investment opportunities. This finding is in line with the classical 
economics prediction that new investments are valuable only to the extent that 
their marginal returns exceed the cost of capital. The results also imply that 
higher equity valuations in emerging economies caused a greater increase in firm-
level investment in these areas compared to developing countries. Thus, stock 
market liberalisation in emerging economies allows local firms to raise new 
capital to invest in new ventures. The more significant decreases in the values of 
the estimated coefficients in East Asian countries as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 shows that the crisis had a greater impact on investment 
opportunities in these areas. In addition, the declining values of the coefficients 
for developed countries starting in 2007 suggest that the global financial crisis 
had a significant effect on firms in these areas; moreover, the recovery in 
emerging countries in the Asian region has been faster than the recovery in 
developed countries. 
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Figure 2.  PSTR coefficients of q ratios 
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Figure 3.  Estimated time-varying coefficients of the q ratio, 1991–2010 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the impact of financial constraints on firm-level 
investment in 12 Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand. We find evidence 
of financial constraints faced by Asian firms and support for the underinvestment 
hypothesis reported in previous studies (see, e.g., Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). 
Our study is the first to use PSTR models to provide strong evidence that firm-
level investment is not sensitive only to cash flow, as advocated by previous 
studies. Furthermore, our results suggest that recent studies that use the age or 
size of firms as proxies for financial constraints do not properly gauge the levels 
of ICF sensitivity in developing countries. Our results show strong heterogeneity 
and significant variation in the investment responses to q ratios over time and 
across countries. A strong link between investment opportunities and actual 
investments in the sample countries suggests that stock market valuations in these 
economies are good indicators of future economic growth. We are mindful of the 
fact that our results might be sensitive to measurement errors in the q ratio; these 
potential measurement errors are not completely eliminated even after controlling 
for future profitability and output growth. However, we do not examine the 
measurement errors, if there are any, because this issue is beyond the scope of 
our paper.  
 
 There are certain related empirical questions that are not answered in 
this paper that could provide avenues for future research. For example, we do not 
segregate firms' fixed-asset investments according to core business operations 
and geographical focus. It is probable that export-oriented firms have growth 
opportunities that differ from the growth opportunities of import-oriented firms, 
and export- and import-oriented firms may have different responses to profit 
shortfalls and growth opportunity shocks. In this regard, it would be useful to 
examine the influence of foreign trade exposure at the firm-level. In addition, the 
monopoly power of firms in some Asian countries allows them to secure 
favourable access to external finance. It would be useful to identify the link 
between market power and firm-level investment. Furthermore, it has been 
shown in the asset pricing literature that financial constraints affect risk and 
expected returns (Livdan, Sapriza, & Zhang, 2009). A follow-up study using an 
Asian sample could have implications for foreign fund managers. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  In some cross-country regressions, indicators of financial development at the 
macro level have been used to divide samples of firms into developed and less 
developed markets to test ICF sensitivities across countries (see Islam & 
Mozumdar, 2007; Love, 2003; Wurgler, 2000). 
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2.  Variables that have been used to separate firms into groups of constrained and 
unconstrained firms include gross cash flow (Brown & Petersen, 2009; 
Almeida & Campello, 2007) and net sales (Laeven, 2003). Schiantarelli 
(1996) provides a useful review of the methodological issues associated with 
time-invariant classifications and the use of proxy variables.  
 
3.  Several studies that have included Asian countries are Islam and Mozumdar 
(2007, Love (2003) and Laeven (2003). 
 
4.  Minton and Schrand (1999) argue that higher cash flow volatility implies that 
a firm is more likely to have periods of cash flow shortages, and a firm may 
forgo investment if additional finance is only available at a higher cost. 
Consequently, firms that rely more on external capital than on internal capital 
will decrease future investment. 
 
5.  Using a sample of Compustat firms and measuring growth with several proxy 
variables (e.g., increase in capital expenditure), Lang et al. (1996) find that 
leverage reduces US firms' growth only for firms with low q ratios. Likewise, 
Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) report that U.S. firms with high debt ratios are 
more sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Cai and Zhang (2011,            
p. 392) report that an increase in the leverage ratio is associated with lower 
real investment in the future. Specifically, they find that a 10% increase in the 
leverage ratio in the current quarter on average is associated with a 6.23% 
reduction in the investment rate in the next four quarters. 
 
6.  The first variable (Structure-Activity) equals the log of the ratio of Value 
Traded to Bank Credit. Value Traded equals the value of stock transactions as 
a share of national output. Bank Credit equals the claims of the banking sector 
on the private sector as a share of GDP. The second variable (Structure-Size) 
equals the log of the ratio of Market Capitalization to Bank Credit. Market 
Capitalization is defined as the value of listed shares divided by GDP (Beck & 
Levine, 2002, p. 147). 
 
7.  The logistic smooth transition autoregressive model (LSTAR) has been used 
by Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) to characterise the dynamics of industrial 
production indexes in a number of OECD countries during expansions and 
recessions. 
 
8.  According to Gonzalez et al. (2005), a variable that strongly rejects the 
linearity test (as determined using the p-value of the linearity test statistic, 
LMF) is an ideal transition variable. 
 
9.  See the technical appendix in Gonzalez et al. (2005) for this procedure. 
 
10.  The PSTR investment model is a non-linear model because the transition 
function is multiplied by right-hand side variables. 
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11.  The q ratio and the debt ratio are used in transition functions by Gonzalez            
et al. (2005) and Hu and Schiantarelli (1998). 
 
12.  In other models, such as Models A and C, the values of the slope parameter  
are higher, which implies that the transition function is sharp and might 
correspond to an indicator function, as suggested by Fouquau et al. (2008). 
 
13.  Transition function estimated from the Model A corresponds to an indicator 
function. 
 
14.  Although Model D explains more than 50% of the variation in firms' 
investments, it has higher values for the slope parameters 1 and 2; thus, the 
results of Model D are weaker than the results of Model B. 
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